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It is said that prior to the Third Punic War, whenever Cato the
Elder addressed the Roman Senate he would finish his statement, no
matter the subject matter, with the following exhortation: “ceterum
censeo Carthaginem esse delendam,” or “in my opinion, Carthage must be
1
destroyed.” During Justice Stewart’s later years on the Supreme
Court, his spirited Fourth Amendment dissents evinced comparable
resolve in his quest to maintain the vitality of the warrant require2
ment. History has proven more charitable to Cato’s objective.
The vigor of the warrant requirement has waned considerably
3
since Justice Stewart’s departure from the Court. Meanwhile, the
4
Court has found searches devoid of the other conventional Fourth
Amendment protection, probable cause, to be increasingly acceptable. Unlike most areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where
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PLUTARCH, Marcus Cato, in 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 383 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Macmillan
Co. 1914). Other sources confirm Cato’s frequent references to Carthage although considerable doubt remains as to the exact phrasing. See Charles E. Little, The Authenticity
and Form of Cato’s Saying “Cathago Delenda Est,” 29 CLASSICAL J. 429 (1934) (summarizing
the various sources).
See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 609 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the authorization of warrantless inspections of mines and stone quarries); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 596 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with upholding a
warrantless inspection of an automobile); see also William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost,
In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1075–83 (1994) (examining Justice Stewart’s vigorous dissents in defense of the Warrant Clause).
Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 2, at 1083–96 (describing the gradual weakening of the
warrant requirement in the years after 1982 when Justice Stewart left the bench).
In an effort to avoid needless repetition, the term “search” will hereinafter be used to refer to either a “search” or a “seizure” unless the distinction is somehow relevant in context.
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the Warrant Clause still operates, albeit subject to liberal exceptions,
the Warrant Clause has almost never been applied to “suspicionless
5
searches.” The time has come to reconsider this position.
The current state of suspicionless search law embodies a bizarre
paradox: because one of the two conventional Fourth Amendment
protections (probable cause) is already absent in suspicionless
searches, the other conventional protection (the warrant requirement) must be inapplicable as well. Common sense suggests that
these are the searches for which the warrant requirement remains
most important. This Comment argues that, subject to existing exceptions, the Warrant Clause should presumptively apply to suspicionless searches as it does in other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, suspicionless search jurisprudence represents the
Wild West of the Fourth Amendment: chaotic, sparsely populated,
and yet positioned for rapid expansion. The Supreme Court’s ad hoc
6
development of suspicionless search doctrine has predictably led to a
7
disjointed area of law in search of practicable rules. The lack of clarity, in turn, has highlighted the absence of any defined upper-limit to
8
such expansions. The rise of exceptions to the individualized suspi-
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For background on the relationship between individualized suspicion and searches, as
well as a strong critique of the move away from the requirement of individualized suspicion, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995).
The distinction between suspicionless searches and “special needs” searches merits a brief
explanation at the outset. “Special needs” searches technically represent a subset of suspicionless searches approved by the Supreme Court, although the distinction has become
muddled at best. See infra Part III.C. The term “special needs” was coined by Justice
Blackmun in his concurrence to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in judgment) (“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing interests
for that of the Framers.”). In this Comment, I reserve use of the term “special needs” to a
meaning consistent with this definition. For broader application to searches lacking individualized suspicion, I use the term “suspicionless searches.”
This is a frequently leveled criticism of the “special needs” cases. For an overview of the
difficulties posed in reconciling and synthesizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
this area, see Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme
Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (2007).
See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 563 (1997)

Apr. 2009]

THE VIABILITY OF AREA WARRANTS

1017

cion requirement has thus prompted concern that further en9
croachments upon privacy and liberty interests lie ahead.
The Supreme Court has found justifications for suspicionless
10
searches under circumstances such as sobriety checkpoints, searches
11
12
for contraband in schools, and mandatory drug testing policies.
These manufactured exceptions to conventional Fourth Amendment
doctrine largely represent responses to perceived public perils, perils
that might not have been adequately provided for under existing ju13
risprudence. Yet, these search procedures have been traditionally
disfavored because they are so invasive of individual rights. They
should remain solutions of last resort. This does not mean, however,
that suspicionless searches are necessarily undesirable. Rather, it
suggests that they should be limited and, when justified, optimized to
balance their benefits with the costs of their accompanying intrusions.
Beyond the inherently invasive nature of suspicionless searches,
significant problems exist within the current framework by which
they are implemented. This framework at once over-encourages the

9
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11
12

13

(expressing concern that the move towards a mere reasonableness standard in the “special needs” cases might foreshadow a general move towards a reasonableness standard in
evaluating all searches).
See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 5, at 634 (claiming that unless the Supreme Court returns to a
requirement of individualized suspicion, the “number and intrusiveness of exemptions
from the requirement of individualized suspicion will continue to grow”).
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (concluding that brief detentions of drivers at sobriety checkpoints were consistent with the Fourth Amendment and
the government’s interest in highway safety).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (determining that a suspicionless search of a student by a school
official was permissible under the Fourth Amendment).
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a program of mandatory drug testing for high school athletes under the auspices of a “special need”); Nat’l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (permitting the drug testing
of government employees engaged in narcotic interdiction without individualized suspicion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (determining that individualized suspicion was not required in order to mandate railway employees to submit
to alcohol and drug testing in the wake of an accident).
A number of commentators have thus suggested that the political process is generally a
sufficient safeguard in such cases. See Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of
General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 100–09 (2007) (proposing
that political process protections should allow legislatures to enact suspicionless searches
subject only to rational basis review); Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which
Exception to the Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of
Mass Transit Passengers to Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231, 3293–94 (2006)
(arguing that the political process is sufficiently protective of individual rights in suspicionless search cases as long as the search affects the privacy interests of the majority
equally).
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use of suspicionless searches by law enforcement, and, at the same
time, potentially hampers the primary purposes of these searches.
Government actors have incentives to use these procedures more often than is justified by the underlying need alone. Meanwhile, the
efficacy of suspicionless searches may be undermined by uncertainty
as to the legality of the methods employed, promoting suboptimal
14
methodology.
Ultimately, however, the invasiveness of searches
lacking individualized suspicion is likely their most troubling characteristic.
Despite the problems with the convoluted suspicionless search regime currently in place, the relative infrequency of such cases has limited the urgency of reform. This situation appears to be ripe for
change. An allusion to a “special needs” case that has yet to reach the
Supreme Court demonstrates the possibility that such exceptions will
15
become increasingly important. A suspicionless search procedure
designed to prevent a legitimate threat of a terrorist attack would al16
most certainly be upheld by courts under this doctrine. The nearly
unlimited extent of the harm threatened by a terrorist attack encourages the understanding that a “special needs” search would be both
reasonable and desirable, even to one who believed that other exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement were unwarranted.
A suspicionless search regime is needed that will be flexible enough
to encompass such contingencies, while still providing meaningful
limits on governmental discretion.
This Comment proposes a rethinking of a Fourth Amendment
principle marked by an ever-shrinking purview: the warrant requirement. There is no valid reason why the Warrant Clause should
not be applied to suspicionless searches in the same way as it is to

14

See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random suspicionless subway searches in part because the policy protected privacy interests by allowing
passengers the option of simply leaving the station rather than submitting to a search).

15

A number of other federal courts have, however, dealt with such situations and upheld
such policies under the “special needs” doctrine, even though these cases present clear
law enforcement interests. See, e.g., id. at 275 (upholding New York City’s policy of random suspicionless subway searches to prevent terrorism); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345, at
*10 (D. Mass. 2004) (upholding random subway searches in Boston to protect the convention center from a terrorist attack).

16

Justice O’Connor hypothesized about such an attack in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32 (2000). She concluded that the “Fourth Amendment would almost certainly
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.”
Id. at 44.
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other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, a question naturally follows: how could a government agency, lacking suspicion of any one individual, obtain warrants ahead of time to search
as of yet unidentified persons? The answer lies in area warrants—
judicial warrants that specify the location and timing of a search
without specifying the persons or objects to be searched. This Comment argues that within the suspicionless search context, area warrants are both constitutional and desirable.
Regardless of seeking consistency in the Fourth Amendment, the
ex ante application of the Warrant Clause to suspicionless searches
offers substantial advantages. The addition of the warrant requirement could optimize suspicionless searches in at least three ways.
First, it could better restrict the use of suspicionless searches to those
truly serving important government needs. Second, it could promote
concurrent oversight of these searches by the judiciary, and in the
process it could potentially provide greater legitimacy to the searches.
Third, by encouraging more selective use of the suspicionless search
doctrine pursuant to additional oversight, the proposal seeks to provide counterbalances which should decrease ex post concerns. This,
in turn, may actually encourage courts to allow more invasive search
procedures when necessary. In sum, a drastic departure from conventional Fourth Amendment protections merits experimentation
with innovative counterbalances to compensate.
Part II of this Comment outlines the text of the Fourth Amendment, providing background for the discussion to follow. Part III describes the current state of jurisprudence on suspicionless searches
and seizures. Part IV explains the primary problems embedded within this jurisprudence. This section also suggests why these problems
will likely only be exacerbated over time. Part V explains why upholding the warrant requirement for suspicionless searches is both consistent with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and desirable in
practice. Part VI summarizes the discussion and concludes that the
adoption of area warrants represents a potential solution worth attempting.

17

This does not mean that the warrant requirement will always be practicable for suspicionless searches. As with other areas of search and seizure law, there will be situations
when exigencies preclude the acquisition of a warrant prior to a suspicionless search.
The Fourth Amendment already has various exceptions to account for such exigencies.
There is no reason to suspect that these exceptions would be insufficient in the context of
suspicionless searches, or that new exceptions could not be created.
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II. TEXTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
The story of “sub-probable cause” searches begins with the text of
the Fourth Amendment itself. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
18
the persons or things to be seized.

The text is generally interpreted as containing both a Reasonableness Clause and a Warrant Clause. The interplay between the
two clauses, accompanied by differing historical interpretations
thereof, has engendered tremendous debate over the nature of the
19
warrant requirement. Clearly, arguments as to the proper understanding of the warrant requirement in broader Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence are beyond the purview of this Comment. More importantly, though, they are not particularly relevant.
Regardless of the strength of the so-called “warrant preference”
today, or whether such a preference should even exist, warrants are
20
still a prominent feature of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Although
replete with exceptions, the warrant preference has stubbornly endured. The changes proposed in the following pages simply represent an effort to bring suspicionless searches back in line with mainstream Fourth Amendment doctrine, from which they have
inexplicably been separated. In order to appreciate the current state

18
19

20

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985);
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 (1991). The
most powerful advocate for a Fourth Amendment interpretation that subjugates the Warrant Clause to the Reasonableness Clause has been Akhil Amar. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). For arguments interpreting a vigorous warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment, see Phyllis T.
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 473 (1991); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547 (1999); Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 2; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
Whether a true “warrant requirement” exists within the Fourth Amendment is, perhaps,
the central issue of controversy within the text of the Amendment. Compare California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566 (1991) (referencing “the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment”), with id. at 581–85 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disavowing any “requirement”
for warrants in the Fourth Amendment, arguing that “it merely prohibits searches and
seizures that are ‘unreasonable’”). Despite the ongoing debate, this Comment still makes
use of the term “warrant requirement” to remain consistent with the prior academic literature.
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of law, however, we must consider how and why suspicionless search
doctrine deviated from broader Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
the first place.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIPLE NUANCED APPROACHES TO
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The current state of suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence presents a tolerated mess. A comprehensive understanding of
the doctrine has been undermined by the development of varied, and
often incongruous, pockets of law. In order to appreciate the difficulties posed by current doctrine, as well as the likely impact of any
remedy, we must first ask the question: how did we ever get here?
A. Camara and the Waning of Probable Cause
The first significant step towards a regime permitting suspicionless
searches and seizures is generally considered to have occurred in Ca21
mara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco. The city ordinance at issue
in Camara permitted housing inspectors acting in furtherance of their
duties to enter any building (and residence therein) during reason22
able hours. The petitioner in Camara repeatedly refused entrance
to a housing inspector and was subsequently prosecuted for his ac23
tions.
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the warrantless administrative searches provided for under the city ordinance violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights and, if so,
24
exactly how the rights were implicated. The Court determined that
administrative searches such as those authorized under the ordinance
“are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment” and that the safeguards of the warrant requirement
cannot be circumvented merely due to the administrative nature of a
25
search.
The ruling in Camara was noteworthy for a number of reasons.
First, it held that Fourth Amendment protections are fully applicable
to administrative inspections. Second, and more importantly for the
current inquiry, Camara redefined probable cause in terms of reason-

21
22
23
24
25

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 526 n.1.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 534.
Id.
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ableness, injecting a balancing test into the analysis in the process.
In so doing, the Camara Court opened a breach in the conventional
lines of the Fourth Amendment that would only expand in the years
to follow.
The redefinition of probable cause, however, belied another issue.
In Camara, the Court exemplified a new willingness to radically reshuffle traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in favor of desirable public policy outcomes. To support the sudden vicissitude of
probable cause, the Court suggested a distinction between searches
that are primarily administrative in nature and those that are con27
ducted pursuant to a criminal investigation. However, even though
the decision contrasted searches with a criminal purpose against administrative searches, it failed to offer any concrete justification for
28
distinguishing them. Within the confines of the new reasonableness
test for probable cause it remained unclear how to evaluate the purpose behind a search.
In the forty years since Camara, the Court has repeatedly returned
to the law enforcement distinction when it has scaled back Fourth
29
Amendment protections. Amidst continual attempts to define the
proper balance between public policy considerations and individual
rights, the law enforcement distinction has become the touchstone of
30
suspicionless search jurisprudence. Camara may have been the genesis of suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence, but the doctrinal change it embodied was decoupled from substantive guidance
on how interests were to be balanced.
B. Camara’s Flotsam: The Early Suspicionless Search Cases Conducted by
Law Enforcement
Suspicionless search exceptions developed in an ad hoc manner
following Camara as different policy goals were identified urging
searches that could not be supported under prevailing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Although searches devoid of individualized suspicion had been upheld prior to Camara, these cases were es-

26
27
28
29

30

See id. at 537–38.
See id. at 535, 538–39.
See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 429 (examining unsettled matters after Camara).
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (distinguishing law enforcement officers from teachers due to the investigatory nature of their
positions).
See infra Part III.D.
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31

sentially limited to stops at border crossings. In the wake of Camara,
however, distinct pockets of “sub-probable cause” law began developing.
1. Searches at the National Border
Searches at the national border had been exempted from tradi32
tional Fourth Amendment protections even prior to Camara. The
justification for the exemption, however, has shifted over time. In
33
Boyd v. United States, the Court upheld warrantless customs inspec34
tions of goods entering the country. The Court noted that the same
Congress which had adopted the Fourth Amendment also adopted
the first customs statute, the Collection Act of 1789, which disavowed
35
the warrant requirement for customs searches. The language of the
statute, however, seemed to affirm the requirements of individualized
36
suspicion for even these searches. The language of the statute also
indicated that beyond the practical difficulties of requiring warrants
for customs searches, the primary justification for disavowing the re37
quirement was to ensure the collection of due revenue. Nearly one
hundred years later, to the extent that it examined the question of

31
32

33
34
35
36

37

See infra Part III.B.1.
See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–19 (1977) (offering an overview of the relevant history and precedents); see also Keeley, supra note 13, at 3242–43 (providing detailed factual background).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 622–24.
Section 24 of the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790), reads as
follows:
And be it further enacted, That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other
person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and
if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant
to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to
search for such goods . . . .
See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to the Collection Act of 1789 to illustrate the First Congress’s desire to
maintain individualized suspicion as a requirement even where the warrant requirement
would be inapplicable); Keeley, supra note 13, at 3242 n.79 (explaining that “it is not entirely clear that the Collection Act discussed in Boyd contemplated suspicionless
searches”).
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790).
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border searches, the Boyd Court similarly focused on the revenue38
gathering purposes of customs searches.
In 1925, the Court supplemented the understanding of border
39
searches with dictum from Carroll v. United States, suggesting why automobile passengers entering the country could not avail themselves
40
of conventional Fourth Amendment protections. Perhaps demonstrating a broadening concern over both contraband, in this case alcohol, and illegal entrances by individuals at the national borders,
the Court concluded that: “Travellers may be stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self protection reasonably
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
41
42
in.” The Court affirmed this position in United States v. Ramsey,
finding that probable cause was not required for a customs agent to
43
open mail suspected of containing drugs.
44
Yet, it was not until 1985, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
that the Court explicitly authorized routine searches absent any indi45
vidualized suspicion at the borders. Although the Court referenced
Ramsey and Carroll to support the proposition that the permissibility
of routine suspicionless searches at the border was well established,
46
neither of these decisions went that far. Indeed, the Ramsey Court
was careful not to discuss any requirement of suspicion as it eschewed
47
the requirement of probable cause. The Montoya Court, meanwhile,
seems to have garnered support from a distinct group of post-Camara
48
cases involving suspicionless stops at roadway checkpoints. Whether
38

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. According to the Court:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties
and concealed to avoid payment [sic] thereof, are totally different things from a
search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against
him. . . . In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other it is not.
Id. Interestingly, the distinction the Court drew between impermissibly held goods and
private papers hints at later tests focusing on the criminal purposes of a search.
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Id. at 154.
Id.
431 U.S. 606 (1977).
Id. at 624–25.
473 U.S. 531 (1985).
Id. at 538.
See id. at 538 n.1.
See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620–25.
In particular, the Court referenced United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63
(1976), in support of the permissibility of routine suspicionless searches at the border.
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or not routine suspicionless searches were being conducted at the
borders prior to this time, Montoya finally settled the permissibility of
such searches. While the Court noted the unique sovereignty inter49
ests implicated by border crossings to support its conclusion, Camara
and its recent progeny provided the framework and context that
50
made the decision appear to be so obviously correct.
Border searches serve as an apt entry point for a discussion on
suspicionless searches. Although the warrant requirement and the
(full) probable cause requirement had never been applied to such
searches, the gradual codification of an exception to individualized
suspicion illustrates a Court reacting to newly perceived threats at the
borders. Cross-border vehicular rum-running during prohibition, illegal immigration, and the rise of international narcotics trafficking
are examples of difficult-to-curtail twentieth century threats for which
the national borders are the logical enforcement point. Although
national security concerns have clearly paralleled other border control concerns during the twentieth century, the specter of terrorism
in the twenty-first century presents a novel concern that may force
changes in suspicionless search jurisprudence within the national
51
borders. Just as revealing, the early post-Camara border search cases
first demonstrated the difficulties inherent in maintaining separate
and viable pockets of law for suspicionless searches.
2. Checkpoint Stops
More than any other category of suspicionless searches, roadway
checkpoint cases have illustrated the difficulty of shaping workable
rules for application to an entire category of suspicionless searches,
let alone to suspicionless searches more broadly. Within the broader
penumbra of roadway checkpoints, a number of distinct subcategories have been litigated. Checkpoints targeting illegal immi52
53
54
grants, intoxicated drivers, and unlicensed drivers have all been
upheld as searches exempt from the traditional requirement of indi-

49
50
51
52
53
54

Montoya, 473 U.S. at 538. Martinez-Fuerte upheld a series of suspicionless checkpoint stops
on highways just beyond the Unites States-Mexico border which sought to apprehend illegal immigrants. 428 U.S. at 562–63.
Montoya, 473 U.S. at 537–38.
See id. at 537.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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vidualized suspicion. Such cases foreshadowed the inherent tension
that would develop with the primary purpose test expounded in City
55
of Indianapolis v. Edmond.
Roadway checkpoints, specifically those targeting illegal immigrants, were among the first suspicionless search cases to reach the
56
Court in the wake of Camara. The Court has generally upheld the
use of such checkpoints, despite their obvious law enforcement pur57
pose, as long as certain safeguards exist. The limits of these checkpoints were explored in a series of cases during the 1970s. In the earliest checkpoint cases, the Court distinguished roadway checkpoints
from roving vehicle patrols near the border, which require reason58
able suspicion based on articulable facts for a stop. The key distinction between checkpoints and roving stops is the availability of
checkpoint procedures to limit the otherwise unlimited discretion of
59
law enforcement officers in selecting individuals for stops.
Even
checkpoint searches are impermissible if established procedures fail
to meaningfully limit officers’ discretion in selecting vehicles for a
60
search. However, the Court has proven less concerned about the
discretion to merely stop individual vehicles in the context of a
61
checkpoint. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that a
brief detention for questioning at immigration checkpoints required
62
no quantum of individualized suspicion. This holding paved the
way for checkpoint stops targeting additional classes of individuals.
A few years after Martinez-Fuerte, the Court addressed the constitutionality of discretionary “spot checks” on roadways targeting unli63
censed drivers and unregistered vehicles in Delaware v. Prouse. Prouse
applied the holdings of the immigration checkpoint cases in this ad55
56
57

58

59
60
61
62
63

See infra Part III.D.
See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 n.12 (referring to the “particular law enforcement
needs served by checkpoints”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–38 (2000)
(acknowledging the law enforcement purpose at work in Martinez-Fuerte, but distinguishing it as not aimed at preventing “ordinary criminal wrongdoing”).
See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (finding that only reasonable suspicion is required for a
roving immigration patrol to stop a vehicle near the border); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at
273 (holding that roving immigration searches near the border must still be predicated
on probable cause).
See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882.
See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (invalidating an immigration checkpoint in
which officers retained full discretion to select vehicles for stops).
428 U.S. 543.
Id. at 556–64.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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ditional context, essentially creating a new checkpoint exception to
the Fourth Amendment in the process. As with the roving patrols in
Almeida-Sanchez, the “spot checks” were held to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment as they failed to place any limits on offi64
cer discretion. Nonetheless, the Court explained that it was not forestalling less invasive methods or techniques that did not involve “the
65
unconstrained exercise of discretion.” In particular, it explained
that “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is
66
one possible alternative.”
The decision also shed light on how governmental interests
should be balanced against privacy interests. The decision suggested
that the safety benefits of the license and registration “spot checks”
were sufficiently important to support checkpoint stops in the absence of individualized suspicion. That this justification could not
67
support discretionary “spot checks” may not have been surprising;
however, the reasoning offered by the Court was. The Court analyzed whether, in furtherance of the state’s goal, the “spot check” was
a “sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon
68
Fourth Amendment interests.” While the unbridled discretion of
enforcing officers was still determinative, that consideration was more
explicitly placed within the confines of a balancing test.
The immigration checkpoint cases did not affect the requirement
of probable cause prior to a full-blown vehicle search, even for those
conducted in conjunction with a checkpoint stop. However, Prouse
quietly expanded the permissible scope of brief seizures at checkpoint stops to include affirmative demands that drivers produce cer69
tain documentation. A decade later, the balancing test at the heart
of the decision was readdressed in the context of sobriety check70
points. The checkpoints at issue in Michigan Department of State Police
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896–97 (finding that discretionary checkpoints do not sufficiently
protect individuals from arbitrary invasions of privacy).
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 663.
In the wake of Prouse, the balancing test for seizures less intrusive than full arrests was reexamined in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), a case involving the seizure of a pedestrian on less than reasonable suspicion. The holding applied the reasoning of Prouse and
the immigration checkpoint cases to seizures more broadly, finding that in balancing the
public interest against the intrusion to individual liberty a central concern is limiting “unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. Thus, later suspicionless search and seizure cases, including checkpoint cases, often refer to the balancing
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71

v. Sitz were part of a pilot program which authorized sobriety checkpoints. Seeking to promote highway safety, the program implemented checkpoints requiring all passing drivers to stop and be
72
“briefly examined for signs of intoxication.”
Acknowledging the
powerful state interest at work, the Court next evaluated the intrusiveness of the checkpoints in question. It found the objective intrusion of the brief questioning to be minimal, as it had with the immi73
gration checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.
The Court also elaborated on language from Martinez-Fuerte to explain the relevance of “subjective intrusion” in the balancing, holding
that only “the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists”
74
need be considered. Sitz further repudiated the need for a “searching examination of ‘effectiveness’” as an element of the balancing
test, holding that it is enough that law enforcement choose amongst
“reasonable alternatives” in selecting a suspicionless search tech75
nique. The decision thus elaborated on the application of the balancing test for checkpoint cases, while still failing to provide any
meaningful limitation on the use of checkpoints.
C. The Development of the “Special Needs” Doctrine
On March 7, 1980, a high school teacher in Middlesex County,
New Jersey brought two girls to the principal’s office for smoking in a
school restroom. After one of the girls denied the allegation, the assistant vice principal searched her purse, finding marijuana and other
evidence of drug dealing in the process. Nearly five years later, Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court, upheld the search of
76
the student’s purse in New Jersey v. T.L.O. Amidst considerable con-

71
72
73
74
75

76

test from Brown rather than from Prouse or the immigration checkpoint cases. See, e.g.,
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990).
496 U.S. 444.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453–54. The Michigan Supreme Court had read the Court’s decision in Brown, 443
U.S. 47, to require an “effectiveness” prong in the balancing test, gauging the ability of
the seizure procedure to promote the state’s interest. Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 429
N.W.2d 180, 183–85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the balancing test should contain such an inquiry, but found that deference to law enforcement
was appropriate on this question as long as the procedure chosen was a reasonable alternative to other techniques. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54
(1990).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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fusion, the decision paved the way for a new suspicionless search
analysis, commonly referred to as the “special needs” analysis.
The term “special needs” was actually coined by Justice Blackmun
77
in his concurring opinion. He explained, “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of
78
interests for that of the Framers.” The majority opinion had no
such “special need” requirement. Rather, the majority found that “a
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, un79
der all the circumstances, of the search.” In essence, the majority
found that, given the unique demands and constraints of a school
environment, the relaxation of Fourth Amendment protections was
80
reasonable.
Nonetheless, it was Justice Blackmun’s opinion, and in particular
his terminology, that resonated beyond the facts of T.L.O. A majority
of the Court soon adopted his “special needs” language, although not
81
his accompanying interpretation of the language. Yet, rather than
providing an encompassing framework to evaluate all searches and
seizures devoid of probable cause or a warrant, the “special needs”
doctrine came to define a distinct category of searches and seizures
conducted by non-law enforcement officials.
A plurality of the Court initially adopted the “special needs” lan82
guage in O’Connor v. Ortega to uphold a public employer’s search of
an employee’s office in the absence of probable cause or a warrant.
The plurality recognized a “special need” to allow public employers
to intrude upon employees’ privacy interests in the furtherance of
83
work-related matters and investigations of misconduct. Instead of
considering whether this need exceeded the “normal need for law en-

77
78
79
80

81

82
83

See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 341 (majority opinion).
Note that unlike in most of the “special needs” cases to follow, individualized suspicion
was present in T.L.O. Based on the attending teacher’s report that the girls had been
smoking in the restroom, the assistant principle had reasonable suspicion that cigarettes
would be found in the purse. Id. at 345–46.
See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 449–50 (explaining that Justice Blackmun understood the
“special needs” threshold to apply to all suspicionless search and seizure situations, including those serving a law enforcement need, in contrast to the ensuing application of
the concept by the Court).
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 725.
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forcement,” the plurality compared the ability of public employers
and law enforcement officers to meet the demands of probable
85
cause. So began the creation of a niche for “special needs” cases, to
be distinguished from those searches conducted by law enforcement
officials.
The boundaries of the “special needs” analysis were further tested
86
in Griffin v. Wisconsin. In Griffin, the majority recognized a “special
need” for the supervision of parolees within Wisconsin’s probation
system. This need, in turn, justified the search of a probationer’s residence in the absence of probable cause or a warrant, pursuant to sta87
tute.
Even though he recognized that the supervision of probationers
represented a “special need,” Justice Blackmun vehemently dissented
in Griffin. He concluded that the presence of a “special need” merely
justified “an application of the Court’s balancing test and an examination of the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause require88
ments.” In Justice Blackmun’s view, the probationer’s status as a recent criminal offender only justified lessening the probable cause
standard to that of reasonable suspicion. Citing the traditionally
heightened protections afforded private dwellings, he also refused to
accept the necessity of discarding the warrant requirement for the
89
search of a probationer’s house. His interpretation, however, was
not to prevail.
The public officials in T.L.O., O’Connor, and Griffin had all possessed individualized suspicion of wrongdoing before engaging in a
search. Any supposition that this would become an inexorable requirement within the “special needs” analysis was soon dispelled in
two cases decided the same day in 1989, Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex90
ecutives’ Association and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
91
Raab. In Skinner, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, applied
the “special needs” rationale to a federal regulation mandating suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees after train accidents. Referencing Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Kennedy explained that “a showing

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724.
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Id. at 875–80.
Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 883–84.
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a
92
search must be presumed unreasonable.”
The holding in Martinez-Fuerte, however, was limited to brief stops
and accompanying questioning. The limited invasiveness of the sei93
zures was a crucial consideration. In general, the checkpoint cases
relied on the distinction between searches and seizures as a primary
limitation on law enforcement activity. Skinner, in contrast, author94
ized suspicionless searches of a person’s body. Outside of the highway checkpoint context, the Court was finding that a search/seizure
distinction was incompatible with the policy tradeoffs it sought to uphold. The distinction simply could not be rationalized with the more
invasive techniques that the Court thought were necessary to combat
evils such as school violence.
This point was soon reemphasized in the context of drug screening. Von Raab involved a challenge to the Customs Service’s proposed
drug-screening program for employees holding certain sensitive posi95
tions, such as those tasked with drug interdiction. Justice Kennedy,
again writing for the majority, determined that the deterrence of
drug-use within sensitive governmental positions represented a “special need” at least as important as the promotion of railway safety in
96
Skinner. Again, the majority found that the absence of individualized suspicion, let alone probable cause or a warrant, did not make
97
the searches presumptively unreasonable.
Unlike in Skinner, the
preemptive nature of the drug-testing in Von Raab may have made the
searches more difficult to disentangle from a “normal need” of law
98
enforcement. However, the federal program seemed to account for
this. As Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]est results may not be used in
a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s con99
sent.”
A final point of interest in Von Raab was how the border search
100
cases supported the recognition of a “special need.”
Even though

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
Id.
Id. at 625–33.
489 U.S. at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 666.
See id. at 668–70 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), and United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), to
support the position that the “national interest in self-protection could be irreparably
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the search in Von Raab ultimately shared a commonality of purpose
with these cases (promoting the integrity of border control operations), the appropriate analysis remained distinct. Indeed, the border search rationale, even if it were applicable in Von Raab, would
have been insufficient to uphold the Court’s finding. While the
Court in Montoya de Hernandez considered routine searches at the
border to be obviously permissible in the absence of probable cause,
it found that reasonable suspicions was still a prerequisite to a seizure
101
of an individual at the border. It is highly unlikely that the Montoya
de Hernandez Court would have considered the collection of urine for
102
drug-testing to be a “routine border search” within the meaning of
its decision. This presents another example of the growing divide between “special needs” cases and other sub-probable cause cases. As
with the search in Griffin of the probationer’s home, a location usually entitled to heightened Fourth Amendment protection, the employer searches in Skinner and Von Raab did not seem as troubling to
the Court as those conducted by law enforcement officers in other
areas.
The Court has more recently applied the “special needs” analysis
to random drug-testing of public school students. A decade after
T.L.O, the Court returned to a school environment in Vernonia School
103
District 47J v. Acton. Writing for six Justices, Justice Scalia found that
the randomized drug testing of students voluntarily participating in
extracurricular athletics was permissible under the reduced burdens
104
of the analysis.
Referencing T.L.O.’s previous application of the
“special needs” doctrine to public schools, Justice Scalia omitted a
discussion on the practicality of applying the warrant or probable
105
cause requirements.
Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, the “special
needs” requirement apparently only asked whether it would be practical to apply the warrant and probable cause requirements to a
106
search under the circumstances.
After deciding that it would be,
the balancing of interests presented a separate issue. Surprisingly,
this approach essentially divorced the importance of the purpose be-

101
102
103
104
105
106

damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics”).
473 U.S. at 541.
Id. at 540.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 664–65.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 655–56.
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hind the search from the determination that a “special need” was
present.
The decision in Acton also signaled an expansion of the “special
needs” doctrine. Unlike in T.L.O., no individualized suspicion was
107
required in Acton. Skinner and Von Raab had previously upheld
searches devoid of individualized suspicion, but the decision in Acton
108
Professor
went farther, as Professor Wayne LaFave has explained.
LaFave has recognized three key departures from prior “special
109
needs” cases. First, the nature of the intrusion is more severe in situations where supervised provision of a urinalysis sample is re110
quired.
Second, the drug-testing of student athletes was not responding to a risk of the same magnitude as any of the prior “special
needs” cases (or, arguably, any other category of cases authorizing
111
searches in the absence of probable cause).
Referencing virtually
all of these categories, Professor LaFave explained, “[a]lthough a
drug-free educational environment is a significant governmental interest, it is quite obviously not of the same order as those just men112
tioned.”
Another crucial distinction in Acton was the absence of a valid explanation as to why a requirement of individualized suspicion would
be either infeasible or impractical prior to drug testing student ath113
letes.
As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent, the school environment, entailing close supervision of students, is actually rather
114
well-suited to a requirement of individualized suspicion.
Ultimately, by discarding an analysis considering the feasibility of heightened Fourth Amendment protections, the opinion may have signaled
the most radical departure from prior cases. The middle ground be-

107
108
109
110

111
112
113
114

Id. at 661.
See Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a Patron
Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2577–79 (1996).
Id. at 2577.
Id. As Professor LaFave points out, the Court in Skinner emphasized the greater concern
over the invasiveness of urinalysis tests and the procedures for procuring the samples. Id.
at 2577–78. However, both Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989), and Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
679 (1989), ultimately upheld these tests despite the heightened intrusiveness. As such,
while this distinction may represent a departure from the earlier “special needs” cases,
the nature of the intrusion was not the great departure in Acton. Instead, the great departure was this heightened intrusion combined with the weaker justification for the search
procedure.
LaFave, supra note 108, at 2577.
Id. at 2578.
Id. at 2578–79.
Vernonia Sch. District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 679 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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tween probable cause-based searches and suspicionless searches had
apparently disappeared.
D. Edmond and Ferguson: Substantive Checks on the Expansion of
Suspicionless Searches or Mere Speed Bumps?
T.L.O. and its progeny left a serious question about how the expansion of suspicionless search doctrine could be reasonably contained. If the Court was having difficulty providing an integrated understanding that encompassed all of the various sub-probable cause
categories, it seemed unlikely that it could create a workable doctrinal boundary to distinguish these cases from the greater mass of
search and seizure law. Still, in the past decade the Court has, with
115
limited success, made a number of attempts to do just that.
An initial indication of the Court’s concern with expanding suspi116
cionless searches appeared in Chandler v. Miller. In Chandler, eight
Justices determined that Georgia’s drug testing requirement for certain elected officials did not fit within a permissible suspicionless
117
search category. While the majority’s language seemed to limit the
purview of suspicionless searches, the facts of Chandler left doubt as to
118
its greater applicability.
The first meaningful attempt to limit the permissible purposes for
119
suspicionless searches occurred in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. In
the summer of 1998, the City of Indianapolis instituted a series of
roadway checkpoints with the expressed goal of interdicting narcot120
ics.
Similar to previously upheld checkpoints, applicable checkpoint guidelines limited officer discretion in the selection of vehi121
cles. Once a vehicle was stopped, a canine trained in the detection
of narcotics would circle the vehicle and signal if narcotics were de122
tected.
No further search would be conducted in the absence of

115

116
117
118
119
120
121
122

See Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless Searches, “Special
Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 521 (2004) (finding that although the
Court has recently embraced the role as a more discerning “policy magistrate” in suspicionless search and seizure cases, it is uncertain whether it will retain this role).
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Id. at 309.
See Sundby, supra note 115, at 517–18 (noting that Chandler was a relatively easy case for
the Court to decide and its impact was questionable in light of the “special needs” cases).
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 34–35.
Id.
Id.
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123

suspicion. Nonetheless, a majority of the Court determined that a
crucial line had been crossed.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that the checkpoint violated an implicit understanding from the accumulated case
law: that a “general interest in crime control” was not a sufficient jus124
In develtification for a departure from individualized suspicion.
oping a new distinction to separate Edmond from all prior suspicionless jurisprudence, Justice O’Connor focused her analysis on the
125
“primary purpose” of the checkpoint.
She concluded, “[w]e decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion
where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordi126
nary enterprise of investigating crimes.”
Absent from the decision was a clear explanation of how courts
should determine a search procedure’s primary purpose. Narcotics
interdiction was easily categorized as its purpose implicated a general
interest in crime control, presenting an easy case in which to establish
the new rule. Clearly, previously upheld suspicionless searches had,
127
at least facially, been conducted for law enforcement purposes. By
explicitly reiterating the holdings of these past decisions, Edmond
128
emphasized the lack of a viable distinction.
Even if the decision
had provided clear guidance on which purposes were permissible, it
still failed to explain how to adequately distinguish a primary purpose
from an ancillary one. As Indianapolis had explicitly stated the narcotics-interdiction purpose of its checkpoints, there was little ques129
However, a simple counterfactual
tion as to its primary purpose.
indicates the difficulty of making such determinations. If Indianapolis had not stated the purpose of these checkpoints, or if it had
masked the checkpoints as attempts to regulate other lawful purposes
(such as verifying driver licenses), the judicial determination of the
checkpoint’s primary purpose might well have come out differently.
The most recent applications of the primary purpose test have
heightened the stubborn mystery that encompasses suspicionless
searches and the Fourth Amendment. In Ferguson v. City of Charles123
124
125
126
127

128
129

Id.
Id. at 41 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 44.
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (acknowledging that the goals in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, securing the border and arresting drunk drivers, respectively, are law enforcement activities
implicating criminal proceedings).
See id. at 48.
See id. at 35.
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130

ton, the Court invalidated a public hospital’s policy of reporting to
police the prenatal use of cocaine, determined by drug-screens, by
131
The Court held that the situation was distinexpectant mothers.
guishable from prior “special needs” cases due to the immediate law
enforcement objectives of the program and the use of the drug132
screens in criminal prosecutions.
In so doing, the majority found
that the ultimate purpose of the hospital policy was not controlling.
The majority admitted that the hospital’s ultimate purpose may have
133
been to encourage the women in question to seek treatment.
In
this case, however, the immediate purpose of the program was held
134
to be indistinguishable from its “primary purpose.” As the immediate purpose of the program was to collect evidence for a criminal
prosecution, the majority found that the program violated the Ed135
mond test.
Any distinction between the impermissible purpose in
Ferguson and the permissible purposes in prior highway checkpoint
136
cases is dubious at best.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO RATIONALIZE
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOCTRINE
The prevailing suspicionless search regime is at once too broad
and too restrictive. It is too broad in that it fails to demarcate clear
boundaries between permissible and impermissible searches based on
the purposes of the searches. It is too restrictive in that it limits the
techniques available to law enforcement in the furtherance of permissible goals. Such limitations have proven manageable (if not coherent) under the narrow circumstances in which the Court has examined law enforcement searches. New demands for suspicionless
searches, however, are demonstrating the difficulties of applying current case law to a broader spectrum of cases. Considering the past
forty years of suspicionless search jurisprudence, anyone anticipating
a doctrinal solution to such challenges should not hold his breath.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 79–85.
Id. at 82–84.
Id.
Id. at 84.
See, e.g., Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 479–80 (examining the similarity between the immediate law enforcement purpose of the hospital in Ferguson and the immediate law enforcement purposes at work in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte).
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A. A Problem of Purpose
The range of permissible purposes for suspicionless searches is
not meaningfully restricted by the current state of the law. The confusion suggests at least two undesirable consequences. First, and
most obviously, searches that actually represent an undesirable tradeoff between public policy and an invasion of individual liberties are
likely to be permitted under the current regime. Second, the confusion may actually discourage other searches that actually reflect a desirable tradeoff.
By grafting the primary purpose test onto the existing balancing
test, the Court apparently sought to limit the permissible rationales
for suspicionless searches. While the primary purpose test, on its
face, proscribes a vast range of overt law enforcement conduct, its
clarity is limited to those law enforcement techniques supported by
an evident primary purpose. The ability of the test to restrict undesirable search techniques with multiple or uncertain purposes is high137
ly suspect.
Indeed, the test has added an entirely new element of
138
confusion to suspicionless search jurisprudence. Assuming that the
Court continues to examine suspicionless search cases so as to promote perceived desirable outcomes on a case-by-case basis, this confusion is likely to persist. Presumably, the primary purpose test also
serves as a limit on the Court by restricting the spectrum of permissible purposes. As with purported limits placed on law enforcement,
however, any such restriction is superficial and prone to gamesman139
ship.
The primary purpose test fails to adequately restrict the use of
suspicionless searches by law enforcement in two ways. First, despite
the protections of Edmond and Ferguson, there is a heightened risk of
entirely pretextual claims in “special needs” cases that cannot be
140
checked by the test. Second, even when law enforcement agencies
possess suitable “non-law enforcement” justifications for a “specials
needs” search, such as the interdiction of drunk drivers, they will like-

137

138
139
140

See generally Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes
and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293 (2006) (discussing the application of
Edmond in multi-purpose checkpoints).
See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 484–85 (examining the problems introduced by the test).
See id. at 485.
See id. at 484 (concluding that based on the Court’s track record with pretext inquiries, it
is unlikely that post-Edmond cases would be subjected to careful scrutiny for a pre-textual
purpose).
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141

ly overuse such procedures.
Whenever a law enforcement agency
considers a suspicionless search, it cannot fail to consider the possibility that the otherwise impermissible procedure will reveal unrelated
evidence of criminality. Under such circumstances, law enforcement
agencies will be encouraged to engage in these procedures more frequently than in the (purely theoretical) situation where the promotion of the policy-driven “special need” is the only goal. Presuming
that some optimal level of searches or seizures exists to promote the
“special needs” interest at stake, the inherent weight of traditional law
enforcement objectives in an agency’s decision to conduct a “special
needs” search threatens to severely over-encourage such proce142
dures.
Consider, for example, the difficulty of determining the primary
purpose of a license-and-registration checkpoint purportedly regulat143
ing the congestion caused by an open-air drug market. Despite the
inherent difficulty of parsing apart the purpose at hand, in some situations well-defined “programmatic purposes” may be evident, assist144
ing the task.
However, a number of concerns suggest that a “programmatic purposes” analysis will not provide an adequate solution.
First, it is unlikely that the information required to make such an examination will often be present. Second, even when such information is apparently present, these ex post inquiries into law enforcement intent are inherently difficult affairs, decreasing confidence in
outcomes. Finally, determinations of “programmatic purposes” are
145
necessarily fact-intensive and time-consuming judicial efforts. Even

141

142
143

144

145

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that police officers
had instituted the traffic safety stops at issue following complaints about speeding, as well
as complaints about drug dealing, gun violence, robberies, and assaults); Holland, supra
note 137, at 321 (discussing Davis and the difficulty of uncovering secondary purposes
under the Edmond primary purpose test).
Holland, supra note 137, at 322–23.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented with this
situation in United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Although decided
before Edmond established the primary purpose test, the court nonetheless found that the
“principal purpose” of the roadblock was to conduct license-and-registration checks and
that “[w]hatever advantage was gained in drug enforcement was coincidental.” Id. at
1312–13; cf. United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that Edmond
requires a more exhaustive analysis of potential “programmatic purposes” in the determination of a similar checkpoint’s primary purpose (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000)).
See Holland, supra note 137, 346–47 (arguing that a discerning examination for “programmatic purposes” can effectively apply the basic Edmond test for highway checkpoints
and protect against abuses).
See id. at 347.
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if such purposes could be found, both the judiciary and law enforcement would be burdened by the search. The guidelines that generally accompany roadway checkpoints would certainly assist in this
task, but there is no requirement that the purposes of a procedure be
clearly delineated. Indeed, the prevalence of a “programmatic purposes” inquiry might actually create a perverse incentive for law enforcement agencies to stop offering clear explanations of the purposes behind checkpoints.
Suspicionless searches are permitted with the understanding that
they are unusually offensive to individual liberties. Whether a valid
non-law enforcement objective exists for a suspicionless procedure,
the over-application of these procedures remains a significant concern. This concern is likely to only grow as Fourth Amendment exceptions are authorized under new circumstances and increasingly
146
embraced by law enforcement.
The primary purpose test cannot
adequately separate desirable and undesirable search procedures on
its own. The standard is plagued by uncertainty and a significant potential for abuse. Realistically, however, we must accept that a comprehensive regime effectively rationalizing the disjointed facets of
suspicionless search law is unlikely to develop organically from the
primary purpose test.
1. An Insufficient Balancing Test
While the current state of the law inadequately limits the purposes
which can support suspicionless searches, conversely, it also unduly
restricts the techniques permissible in achieving these purposes.
Again, the absence of judicial guidance is largely responsible. The
enacting agency has incentives to select sub-optimal techniques in
order to guarantee that the search procedure will be found reasonable on review. The problem is aggravated by certain considerations
that the Court has emphasized in the balancing test. Some of the
elements that the Court has found to support the reasonableness of
searches, in fact, undermine their efficacy without tangibly protecting
individual rights.
These problems have not affected all of the sub-probable cause
search categories equally. The techniques employed by law enforcement officers have received much greater scrutiny than those em-

146

See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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147

ployed by other public officials. This makes sense for two reasons.
First, to the extent that such scrutiny seeks to limit the discretion of
officers during search and seizure procedures, it seems to be justified.
Second, in situations where other public officials conduct the search
or seizure, there is usually some additional link between the party
148
Arguably, the consearched and the body conducting the search.
nection between the parties makes the search more reasonable (or
perhaps the lack of an external connection to the party searched
makes law enforcement searches appear less reasonable).
Based on these considerations, the additional scrutiny has been
fairly easy to justify for the extant categories of suspicionless law enforcement searches, like those at checkpoints. Most of the restrictions imposed on these procedures have been appropriately justified
to limit discretion and selective enforcement. However, the rise of
new categories of desirable law enforcement searches lacking individualized suspicion has emphasized the need for greater safeguards
149
than in the checkpoint cases.
On its face, the reasonableness balancing test derived from Camara seems to account for situations where more invasive techniques are
warranted by a greater public need. As the extent of the need increases, so will a court’s willingness to authorize more invasive techniques. However, the variable application of the balancing test also
limits the ability of a governmental agency to predict which techniques will be upheld post facto by the judiciary. This uncertainty
may result in the self-selection of sub-optimal methods by governmental agencies.

147

Indeed, at times it has appeared that the techniques chosen by non-law enforcement officials have received virtually no scrutiny whatsoever. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Acton. The opinion upheld a technique for the suspicionless drug testing
of student athletes without examining whether a technique utilizing individualized suspicion requirement would even be practical. See supra Part III.C.

148

Consider, for example, the connection between a student and a school (T.L.O.) or a public employer and an employee (Skinner).

149

Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (requiring sufficient safeguards to prevent officer discretion and suggesting that there must be some affirmative indication that
the search procedure in question would promote the public good), with New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (requiring no such restrictions). While it is true that Prouse’s
apparent requirement of provable utility was eschewed in Sitz, in many ways the policy justifications for sobriety checkpoints place them closer to “special needs” cases than traditional checkpoint cases. As such, Sitz is better understood as a transitional case that foreshadowed policy-focused “special needs” to come. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990).
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Compounding the problem, in evaluating the invasiveness of a
technique, courts often emphasize the importance of factors which
directly undermine its efficacy. Accepting that certain suspicionless
searches can be justified while still being offensive to privacy interests,
a painful irony results. In order to limit the invasiveness of searches,
courts encourage methods that may undercut the purposes justifying
the procedures in the first place. Consequently, individuals may unnecessarily endure suspicionless search techniques which inadequately promote the underlying goals. The incremental invasion of
rights produced by a more invasive technique must be weighed
against the possibility that the primary invasion of rights occasioned
by the initial search or seizure will be rendered ineffectual in the absence of the technique.
2. Black Sails on the Horizon: Why the Situation Will Get Worse Sooner
Rather than Later
For reasons described above, these restrictions primarily hamper
search procedures conducted by law enforcement officials. Although
such restrictions may be justifiable—or at least understandable—in
the context of the cases that have reached the Court to date, new
threats are challenging the desirability of such restrictions. In particular, contemporary concerns over terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events are beginning to prompt new categories of suspi150
cionless searches and seizures in lower courts. The potential gravity
of the harm implicated by these events sets them apart from prior
cases. It also distinguishes them from new categories of suspicionless
151
searches that are currently being litigated in lower courts.
The expansion of suspicionless search categories and the growing
disparity in the harms sought to be prevented by such searches present serious challenges to the coherent and comprehensive regula152
tion of the varied categories as a whole.
Assuming that increased
150
151

152

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Consider, for example, the application of the “special needs” doctrine and its corollaries
to mandatory DNA sampling from arrestees. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA
Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 489–98 (2001) (examining differing
opinions in lower courts as to whether DNA sampling may be permissible under the “special needs” or related doctrines).
For example, rising concerns over terrorism have prompted proposals to establish special
approaches for terrorism-related searches. See, e.g., Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless
Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 210 (2007)
(recommending reviews of proposed terrorism-related checkpoints by the Department of
Homeland Security as a check against unfettered law enforcement discretion).
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deference to law enforcement is justified under certain circumstances, an additional problem follows: if increasingly invasive techniques are permitted, there will be a correspondingly heightened
concern over potential abuses.
V. FACING THE FACTS: THE ADVANTAGES OF APPLYING THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT TO SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The rise of the contemporary suspicionless search and seizure regime threatens to imprint a great irony into the Fourth Amendment:
the less that you are suspected of committing a crime, the more likely
it is that you can be searched without a warrant. This section proposes to dismantle that irony and to significantly mend suspicionless
search and seizure doctrine in the process.
153
With limited exceptions, the Court has found that the warrant
requirement does not extend into the realm of sub-probable cause.
One proffered justification for this predicament is that the purposes
of the warrant requirement are not furthered in situations where in154
dividualized suspicion is lacking.
Justice Scalia has gone even farther by concluding for the majority in Griffin that the warrant procedure would be unconstitutional in its application under such
155
circumstances.
This section argues that neither of these conclusions holds true. First, the constitutionality of area warrants lacking
individualized suspicion will be addressed. Next, the utility of area
warrants in the context of suspicionless searches will be examined.
A. The Constitutionality of Area Search Warrants
1. The 1970s and Early Support for Area Searches
There are two potential constitutional obstacles to applying the
Warrant Clause to suspicionless searches. The first potential obstacle
is met at the start of the Warrant Clause: “and no Warrants shall is-

153

154

155

The primary exception is for administrative searches. The warrant requirement may still
apply in such cases, even though there is a reduced standard for probable cause. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1967) (requiring a warrant prior to a
housing inspector’s search of a building even under a relaxed standard for probable
cause).
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–65 (1976) (refusing to apply
the warrant requirement to a checkpoint search as the purposes of the warrant requirement would not be served).
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1987).
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156

sue, but upon probable cause.”
A literal reading of the Warrant
Clause, then, apparently requires that any and all warrants be sup157
The second potential obstacle appears
ported by probable cause.
later in the Warrant Clause in the so-called particularity requirement,
which requires that a warrant describe “the place to be searched, and
158
the persons or things to be seized.” A close textual reading of the
particularity requirement arguably restricts the application of warrants to those searches where a threshold of particularity can be met
with respect to the persons, or items, sought. Area warrants would
likely not be able to individually identify the persons to be searched
159
or seized. Further, even if an area warrant could identify a class of
individuals to be targeted, the identification of a group as a search
target would still arguably be insufficient.
However, the Court has not interpreted the Warrant Clause literally as suggested above. First, Camara explicitly rejected the require160
ment of probable cause for administrative area warrants.
Rather
than applying the traditional understanding of probable cause to
such warrants, the Court evaluated the housing inspection program
161
before it by looking purely for reasonableness. Within this test, the
governmental interest was held to be the determinative factor: “If a
valid public interest justified the intrusion contemplated, then there
162
is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.” Ca-

156
157

158
159

160
161
162

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See, for example, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Griffin, which explained:
While it is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands probable cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse runs up against the constitutional
provision that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of the nature as to require probable cause.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 (citation omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
This, however, is not necessarily true. It may often be the case that the individual members of a class targeted by a suspicionless search or seizure are fully identifiable beforehand. In the context of administrative inspections this has generally proven true. See,
e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (authorizing
warranted area-inspections of buildings). Virtually all of the “special needs” searches and
seizures to reach the Court have similarly provided a targeted class of individuals identifiable beforehand. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(finding railroad employees involved in a rail accident); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (providing for certain treasury employees); Griffin, 483
U.S. 868 (discussing probationers); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying
to students).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–35.
Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 539.
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mara’s promulgation of a reasonableness analysis for determinations
of probable cause represented a tremendous paradigm shift in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. That the same decision applied
this analysis within the context of a warranted search supports the
conclusion that the Camara Court did not intend to create a threshold below which a warrant could not be issued. Rather, the decision
suggests that the new reasonableness analysis for probable cause
should inform the warrant requirement as well.
Subsequent cases involving administrative searches support this
conclusion. Consider, for example, the “closely-regulated” business
exception to the Fourth Amendment. As in Camara, administrative
searches of “closely-regulated” businesses are subject to a reduced
standard for probable cause that does not require individualized sus163
picion. In such cases, the Court has developed an exception to the
warrant requirement to allow for warrantless searches where: (1) a
substantial governmental interest existed; (2) the warrantless inspections were necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the
search contained a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war164
rant.
Yet, where the Supreme Court has required a warrant for an administrative search, it has made clear that it will not apply a rigorous
understanding of the particularity requirement. Consider Marshall v.
165
Barlow’s Inc., in which the Court upheld the warrant requirement
for work-place inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health
166
Act of 1970. Unlike the typical warrant for a search of a location, a
warrant for an administrative search lacking the traditional level of
probable cause generally cannot provide much detail beyond the address that is to be searched. Indeed, such a search is usually premised
on the fact that the government does not know exactly what it is look167
The same is true for suspicionless searches. For such a
ing for.
warrant, the government will likely be able to provide an address, a
stated purpose, and general parameters for a search. This should be

163

164
165
166
167

See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–702 (1987) (applying a reduced standard
of probable cause for the administrative inspection of a vehicle dismantling business);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (applying the lower standard to inspections
of mines).
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03.
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Id. at 325.
See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (noting that the inspection at issue was aimed at ensuring citywide compliance and was not based on evidence of specific problems at the address in
question).
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sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement under the unique
circumstances of these searches. Moreover, even if only a modicum
of particularity could be specified in a suspicionless search warrant,
this modest amount of particularity must be contrasted against the
alternative. In the absence of a warrant, suspicionless searches have
no particularity requirement whatsoever.
Still, in the context of suspicionless searches, the Supreme Court
has generally proven divided on the constitutionality of area searches,
although it has never addressed the issue in any depth. Justice Powell
was perhaps the most vociferous supporter of their constitutionality.
Early in the Court’s suspicionless search jurisprudence, he concluded
that “the determination of whether a warrant should be issued for an
area search involves a balancing of the legitimate interests of law en168
forcement with protected Fourth Amendment rights.” Justice Powell would have analyzed the necessity for warrants in situations lacking individualized suspicion, as in Almeida-Sanchez, by examining the
standard Fourth Amendment exceptions to the warrant requirement,
169
namely exigency.
Beyond the classic exceptions, Justice Powell’s
concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez also analyzed the feasibility of the
warrant requirement under the particular circumstances of the
170
case.
Such an analysis was fully compatible with his focus on reasonableness. Indeed, it seemed to parallel the consideration of less
invasive alternative means in mainstream Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Until Justice Scalia’s opinion in Griffin, the Court appeared to be
divided as to the constitutionality of area warrants. However, in at
least one of the early suspicionless search cases—Almeida-Sanchez—a
171
majority of the Court appeared to accept their constitutionality.

168
169
170
171

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 284 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 270 n.3 (“The Justices who join this opinion are divided upon the question of the
constitutionality of area search warrants such as described in Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion.”). Although the split within the Almeida-Sanchez majority on the issue is uncertain, both Justice Powell’s concurrence and Justice White’s dissent (with which three
additional justices joined) accepted the constitutionality of such area warrants. See id. at
279–81 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the warrant requirement is fully applicable
to searches lacking probable cause); id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting) (“I agree with Mr.
Justice Powell that such a warrant so issued would satisfy the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
On this basis, it is more likely than not that, at the time, a majority of the Court did not
view probable cause as a prerequisite for a warrant. As to the ongoing nature of the divide, the Court appeared to be unwilling to settle the issue through the checkpoint cases,
even when the issue was implicated in lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-
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Since then, the Court appears to have gone out of its way to avoid
having to rule on the issue. When the issue finally reappeared in
T.L.O., the majority simply held that a warrant would be impractical
under the circumstances, failing to note any potential constitutional
172
issues. Focusing on the practical concerns of the setting, the Court
173
analogized to its Camara opinion. By relying on the unsuitability of
a warrant to the school environment, the majority appeared to presume that a warrant based on less than probable cause could be constitutional under the circumstances. Further, the examination closely
paralleled Justice Powell’s concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez, emphasizing the reasonableness of the search under the practical circum174
stances.
In sum, the Court’s prior jurisprudence hints that area warrants
are, in fact, constitutionally permissible. The continuing Fourth
Amendment focus on reasonableness in the wake of Camara only further suggests this. Indeed, the reasonableness of such searches is only more evident when the theoretical underpinnings of the alternative understanding are scrutinized.
2. The Fallacy of the (Apparently) Prevailing Understanding
While a strict textual analysis may support Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the invalidity of area searches, it cannot explain the permis175
sibility of such searches in other circumstances. More egregiously,
this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment creates a distressing paradox. On the one hand, suspicionless searches and seizures bear an
uncomfortable resemblance to the general warrants that so vexed the
176
Framers, albeit absent the warrant procedure. In at least one situation, the Court has even authorized suspicionless searches of homes,

172
173
174
175
176

Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 n.15 (1976) (determining that since no warrant was needed, the
issue need not be addressed even though it had been the principle issue before the Ninth
Circuit below).
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
Id.; see also id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (presuming the constitutionality of warrants in “special needs” cases where probable cause is absent).
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra Part III.A.
See Davies, supra note 19, at 576. Although Davies recounts that the Framers’ primary
concern was with searches of homes under general warrants, he explains that the Framers’ “larger purpose” was “to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers.” Id.
at 556. But see Amar, supra note 19, at 771 (arguing that the Framers were more concerned with judicial abuses than with warrantless intrusions by government agents).
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the very intrusion with which the Framers were most concerned. In
contrast, the warrant requirement, which could serve as a potential
restraint on abuses of official discretion, has almost never been ap178
plied in the suspicionless search context. Thus, paradoxically, while
suspicionless searches and seizures resemble general warrants, they
are not constrained by the requirement of actually obtaining a warrant. They are, in a sense, just general searches and general seizures
lacking any substantive oversight.
Regardless of the type of searches that the Framers were most
concerned with, the warrant requirement can potentially serve to lim179
it official discretion and define permissible governmental activity.
Ironically, under Justice Scalia’s view of the Fourth Amendment, the
less one is suspected of wrongdoing by the government, the more
likely it is that the government will avoid judicial oversight for search180
ing that person.
This interpretation enfeebles the Warrant Clause
to the point of nullity. Under any understanding of Fourth Amendment history, this cannot represent the Framers’ intent. The real
question then is what, if any, compelling reasons exist not to unify
suspicionless search doctrine with the rest of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Potential Benefits of Applying the Warrant Requirement to Suspicionless
Searches
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear exception to the
warrant requirement for suspicionless searches and seizures. Although Justice Scalia has opined a view suggesting their unconstitutionality, the Court’s prevailing approach in these cases has been to
bypass the warrant requirement through an unparalleled solicitude

177
178

179

180

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); see also Davies, supra note 19, at 642–49
(explaining the unique concern in the colonies over intrusions into homes).
The sole exception exists in the administrative search context where searches of closely
regulated industries may still require warrants even though no individualized suspicion
exists. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1978).
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment’s “protection consists in requiring that . . . inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
This predicament bears a certain resemblance to the point that Justice Stewart made of
closely regulated industries in Donovan, when he criticized the Court’s reasoning for suggesting that “the scope of the Fourth Amendment diminishes as the power of governmental regulation increases.” Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 612 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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with reasonableness. Time and time again, the Court has found that
the maintenance of the warrant requirement under the specific cir181
cumstances in suspicionless search cases would prove unworkable.
Alternatively, the Court has at times suggested that a warrant proce182
dure would prove superfluous in the case before it. Presuming that
area search warrants on less than probable cause can be constitutional, neither of these arguments can explain why the warrant requirement has never been applied in any of the contexts examined
except for administrative searches.
More importantly, these arguments cannot account for persuasive
justifications encouraging the application of area warrants under
more expansive circumstances. The traditional benefits of the warrant requirement are fully applicable to searches on less than probable cause. However, where law enforcement lacks the traditional
requirement of probable cause, the application of a warrant requirement has unique benefits. First, the warrant procedure requires (or
could require) law enforcement to clearly delineate the goals of a
search and the methods to be used in furtherance of those goals.
Second, to the extent that the warrant procedure serves as an obstacle to law enforcement, it may encourage law enforcement agencies
to self-prioritize the most important (or effective) of these privacyinfringing searches. Third, by reducing ex ante uncertainty, a warrant procedure may actually encourage more effective methods to be
used during these searches.
Such steps are all the more important because the primary purpose test likely over-encourages the use of suspicionless searches.
Once a valid special need is identified, the enforcing governmental
agency has a powerful alternative reason to conduct a suspicionless
search no matter the importance of the need. The desire to detect,
or obtain evidence of, criminality unrelated to the “special need” is
difficult, if not impossible, to separate from a valid interest in promoting the “special need” itself. Although the Supreme Court has
attempted to limit the use of suspicionless search doctrine in support
183
of pre-textual stops, such limits fail to ensure that governmental

181

See supra Part V.A.

182

See id.

183

The Supreme Court has, for example, refused to allow random roving car stops as these
are perceived to grant too much discretion to individual officers and increase the risk of
abuse. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558–59 (1976) (distinguishing
routine checkpoint stops from random roving-patrol stops).
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agencies are not over-enforcing these privacy-infringing procedures
for general crime prevention purposes.
The warrant requirement could limit such over-enforcement,
however. During the warrant application process, an over-enforcing
agency would have to provide the underlying purpose that supported
the search, opening the door to at least some judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, the process would likely encourage closer involvement by
District Attorney offices and state Attorney General offices with local
law enforcement agencies. In addition to the potential benefits of
judicial oversight, such involvement would hopefully encourage
stronger internal controls and oversight within state governments.
Indeed, if a disingenuous purpose were at work, the reporting requirement would potentially open a state actor to public scrutiny as
well (although not necessarily immediately). This risk, along with the
additional time and resources required, would discourage suspicionless search applications that were not actually urgent (i.e. those
that lacked a sufficiently compelling purpose in the first place).
At the same time, when circumstances so demand, the warrant
process might actually allow for more invasive techniques than would
otherwise be imposed. By detailing exactly what procedures are permissible, warrants could eliminate any uncertainty in law enforce184
ment’s selection of procedures.
In essence, law enforcement officers would know exactly how far they could reach in promoting the
search’s purpose. Thus, when in doubt, law enforcement agencies
would not have to worry about utilizing less effective methods just to
ensure that the search would later be upheld by a court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Suspicionless search and seizure doctrine may represent an incoherent mess, but it is nevertheless understandable. The confusion of
tangent Fourth Amendment fields has been compounded in this particular area by the great variability of purposes and methods presented in suspicionless search cases. Solutions have remained elusive.
While doctrinal changes are undoubtedly necessary, pragmatically,
the most important step toward a viable suspicionless search regime
lies with procedural changes. Regardless of the shifting doctrinal
borders of suspicionless search jurisprudence, a more effective pro184

See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random suspicionless subway searches in part because the policy protected privacy interests by allowing
passengers the option of simply leaving the station rather than submitting to a search).
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cedural framework promises to elucidate the analysis and to promote
better results in individual cases.
This Comment proposes that a return to a conventional Fourth
Amendment principle in the guise of the warrant requirement will at
least improve the situation. A further implication is that area warrants are both constitutional and desirable in effecting this result. As
new demands on law enforcement develop in the Twenty-first Century, the existing relationship between public-need and private-liberty
will likely be further challenged. The ultimate conclusion of this
Comment is that the promulgation of area warrants to suspicionless
searches will clarify the balancing of interests, promoting netdesirable searches and seizures while limiting net-undesirable ones.
At the very least, the preceding discussion suggests that the time has
come to consider a multi-faceted approach to demystifying suspicionless search doctrine.

